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ABSTRACT: The authors investigate the potential of Health Savings Accounts (HSAs)
to expand health insurance coverage.They examine how many currently uninsured
people might be encouraged to buy coverage through HSAs, and what the impacts
of such actions might be on the group and nongroup health insurance markets.Their
main conclusions: HSAs are not likely to be an important contributor to expanding
coverage among uninsured people because most of them do not face high-enough
marginal tax rates to benefit substantially from the tax deductibility of HSA contri-
butions. Meanwhile, HSAs could potentially destabilize the small-group market. To
the extent that they encourage well-compensated healthy workers to abandon job-
based coverage—a result that is more likely if current HSA provisions are combined
with proposed premium deductibility—HSAs could undermine the entire structure
of job-based coverage among small firms.
*    *    *    *    *
Overview
One of the principal ways in which the government affects the health care
system is through tax policy. In 2003, for example, the favorable tax treatment
of employer-based health insurance plans provided a $165 billion federal
subsidy of the cost of such plans.1 In much the same spirit, the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 included
new provisions granting heightened tax-favored treatment to Health Savings
Accounts when enrollees also join a high-deductible health plan.
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Health Savings Accounts, or HSAs, permit
enrollees to save money, tax-free, that they can use
to cover out-of-pocket expenses associated with
health care.When used in combination with a
high-deductible plan, HSAs, proponents argue, not
only encourage responsible use of health care—by
requiring beneficiaries to cover more of its up-front
costs with their own savings—but offer a new and
valuable health insurance option that will expand
the number of Americans with coverage.2 Advo-
cates also say that patients will have greater choice
among providers, thereby reducing the tendency of
insurers and employers to limit such choices.
The authors of this analysis find, however,
that HSAs are not likely to be an important con-
tributor to expanding coverage among uninsured
people.3 That is because most of the uninsured do
not face high-enough marginal tax rates to benefit
substantially from the tax deductibility of HSA
contributions. Meanwhile, HSAs could potentially
destabilize the small-group market.To the extent
that they encourage well-compensated healthy
workers to abandon job-based coverage—a result
that is more likely if current HSA provisions are
combined with premium deductibility, which has
been proposed by the Administration—HSAs
could undermine the entire structure of job-based
coverage among small firms.
Legislation, History, and Context
Under the HSA legislation,Americans who select
a high-deductible health insurance plan (either
through their employer or in the nongroup mar-
ket) may establish, make contributions to, and make
payments from a tax-free health savings account.
The health insurance plan must include a deduct-
ible of at least $1,000 (but not more than $5,000)
for an individual or at least $2,000 (but not more
than $10,000) for a family.An eligible person, or
his or her employer, may make contributions up to
the value of the deductible (but not more than
$2,600 for an individual or $5,100 for a family) to
the account.The out-of-pocket maximum under
the eligible high-deductible plans is capped at
$5,100 for an individual or $10,200 for a family
(in 2005).
Contributions to HSAs may be made from
pretax income, and withdrawals that are used to
pay for medical expenses—such as deductibles,
copayments, and over-the-counter drugs—are not
taxable.Withdrawals used for other purposes are
taxed and subject to an additional 10 percent
penalty.The recent HSA legislation builds on, but
differs from, several earlier health policy initiatives.
One was a four-year demonstration program,
launched by the federal government in 1996, that
permitted self-employed individuals and small
businesses to participate in tax-advantaged medical
savings accounts.Very few firms, however, chose to
participate in the program, perhaps because of its
temporary status.4 The new legislation, by con-
trast, is permanent, and it extends HSA eligibility
to all individuals and firms.
In another initiative, the Treasury Department
in 2002 authorized Health Reimbursement
Arrangements, which allow employers to establish
and contribute to accounts that their employees
can then use to pay medical expenses. In addition
to these benefits, the new HSAs permit employee
contributions, and the accounts are portable from
one employer to another.
Much earlier, in 1984, the government
established the mechanism of flexible spending
accounts (FSAs) under section 125 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Unlike HSAs, FSAs have a “use it
or lose it” provision—any unused balance remain-
ing in an account at the end of the year is for-
feited. Nevertheless, by 1999 between 15 and 28
percent of the workforce had some form of flexi-
ble spending account.5 This suggests that about
one-fifth of the workforce already has some tax
subsidy for payment of coinsurance and deductibles,
although this subsidy is much smaller and more
uncertain than what is provided by HSAs.
The main subsidy in HSAs derives from the
fact that their balances accumulate free of tax. In
this respect, HSAs resemble other tax-preferred
savings vehicles—particularly traditional and
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Roth individual retirement accounts (IRAs).
Contributions and accumulations under traditional
IRAs, as in HSAs, are not subject to tax. But all
withdrawals from traditional IRAs are taxable,
while HSA withdrawals are not taxed if they are
used for payment of medical expenses. Under
Roth IRAs, accumulations and withdrawals are
not subject to tax, but contributions must be made
out of post-tax income.Thus, HSAs are a better
way to save for medical expenditures than are
either Roth or traditional IRAs. Furthermore,
maximum contributions both to traditional and
Roth IRAs are capped by income.When people
choose to open an HSA in addition to their exist-
ing IRA, they can increase their level of tax-
exempt saving.Analyses suggest, however, that the
effects of such plans on savings are quite small.6
Will HSAs Help the Uninsured?
HSAs offer a new subsidy for health insurance cov-
erage, which may encourage people who do not
have health insurance coverage to purchase it.The
subsidy may also encourage people who do have
coverage to change its form, potentially producing
repercussions throughout the health insurance market.
In the absence of HSAs, people could obtain
premium savings by purchasing high-deductible
plans; and they could achieve long-term investment
savings by contributing to IRAs. In that scenario,
however, they would have to pay all out-of-pocket
expenditures using after-tax dollars.With HSAs, peo-
ple can save the tax on the income used to pay the
out-of-pocket expenditures associated with high-
deductible plans.This implies that the usefulness of
HSAs as a means of expanding coverage centrally
depends on two features: the expected level of out-
of-pocket expenditures under a high-deductible
plan (because this determines the amount now
exempt from tax), and marginal income-tax rates.
We estimated the magnitude of savings asso-
ciated with HSAs by first estimating the out-of-
pocket expenditures incurred by people with high-
deductible health plans.We then calculated the taxes
these individuals would have paid on the earnings
used to pay these expenditures, assuming they did
not have flexible spending accounts. (Note that this
assumption that people do not have FSAs led us to
overestimate the savings associated with HSAs.)
We used the Health Insurance Plan
Abstraction file of the 1996–1998 Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (matched to the full-
year demographic and spending files) to calculate
the average out-of-pocket expenditures on hospi-
tals, physicians, and prescribed treatments by indi-
viduals with high-deductible health plans.The
weighted mean out-of-pocket expenditure for this
group (including those who used no services) in
1996 was $237. Inflated to 2004 dollars (using the
rate of growth of medical care costs reported in
the National Health Accounts to 2002 and a 7.5
percent nominal inflation rate for 2003 and 2004),
yielded an estimate of $386 per person.7
To estimate the tax savings associated with
these out-of-pocket expenditures, we first deter-
mined the marginal tax rates faced by uninsured
adults, based on the March 2003 Current Popula-
tion Survey (Figure 1). More than one-half of
uninsured adults currently have no income tax lia-
bility, which is the reason why most plans that
incorporate tax deductibility as a subsidy would
have little impact on coverage among the uninsured.8
In addition to these marginal income-tax
rates, employees and employers each pay a tax of
7.65 percent for Social Security and Medicare
benefits. Contributions made to HSAs through
payroll deductions are not subject to that tax.
These tax rates and out-of-pocket spending
estimates were then used to calculate the potential
tax savings available through HSAs.The result is
that people, on average, would save between $0
and $117 per year, depending on their tax bracket
and whether the employee’s and employer’s shares
of social-insurance tax rates are included (Tables 1
and 2).The lower the tax bracket, the lower the
savings. (For a description of the procedure we
used to calculate tax savings, see the Methodology
box on page 7.)
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To estimate the tax savings as a share of the
cost of insurance coverage, we calculated the ratio
of these savings to the cost of a nongroup pre-
mium.That cost, assuming a $1,000 deductible
plan, averages about $2,000.9 The savings associated
with HSAs then ranged from 0 percent of premi-
ums—for those low-income uninsured who can-
not make HSA contributions through payroll
deduction—to about 6 percent of premiums for
middle-income uninsured people in higher tax
brackets, who face both the employer and
employee share of premiums (Tables 1 and 2).
How would people currently without health
insurance coverage respond to such savings? How
many would buy a high-deductible plan and open
a health savings account? Similar analyses have
assumed that every 10 percent decrease in the price
of health insurance leads about 6 percent of the
uninsured to take up coverage, a level of “respon-
siveness” (or take-up rate) of 0.6.10 However, this is
likely too large a responsiveness estimate for an
analysis of the take-up of HSAs. In previous
research, the authors have shown that high-deductible
coverage is likely to be much less valuable to unin-
sured people than more generous standard coverage,
so that the cost reductions associated with high de-
ductibles would lead to a smaller take-up response.11
Moreover, the requirement that people need to save
to benefit from an HSA makes such a plan even
less attractive than a simple high-deductible-plan
tax credit would be. For these reasons, we assume a
much lower response rate to HSA-induced reduc-
tions in premiums, or a take-up rate of 0.1.
Our analysis shows that the HSA provisions
alone are likely to increase the number of newly
insured adults by fewer than 100,000, or about
0.3 percent of the current adult uninsured popula-
tion (Table 3). Even under our most generous
assumptions, the number of newly insured would
be less than 2 percent of the number of currently
uninsured adults.This number would be even
lower if we took into account the fact that many
people already have flexible spending arrange-ments
available to them.The value of the subsidy offered
by HSAs is smaller for such individuals—they can
gain only the difference between the tax benefits
of HSAs and FSAs.
The Bush Administration has proposed making
HSAs more attractive by allowing people to deduct
Table 1. Tax Savings by Tax Bracket
Low-Income Uninsured (18.8 million)
Tax Savings
Marginal Income Tax Bracket Dollar Amount Percent of $2,000 Premium
0%1 $0 0%
7.65%2 $30 2%
15.3%3 $59 3%
1 Assumes that HSA contributions are not made through payroll contributions; tax savings are from personal income taxes only.
2 Assumes HSA contributions are made through payroll deductions and employees benefit from their share of Social Security and
Medicare tax savings, in addition to personal income tax savings.
3 Assumes HSA contributions are made through payroll deductions and employees benefit from both employer and employee shares
of Social Security and Medicare tax savings, in addition to personal income tax savings.
Source: Current Population Survey, 2003.
switch their current coverage to higher-deductible
plans in order to qualify for the tax benefits.
Under current rules, HSA-qualifying plans are
likely to be attractive to those at the extremes—to
very healthy people (who can accumulate balances
in their accounts) and to unhealthy people (who
normally reach or exceed their out-of-pocket maxi-
mums and can now make these payments using tax-
favored dollars).The effects of the HSA provisions
will depend on the mix of these types who choose
the plans. However, because so many purchasers in
the nongroup market already purchase high-deduct-
ible plans, the HSA provisions are likely, on balance,
to encourage unhealthy people to buy higher-
deductible plans, thereby driving up the premiums
of high-deductible plans in the nongroup market.
If this happens, the HSA provisions might have the
unexpected effect of shifting some healthier people
in the nongroup market into lower-deductible
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premiums for high-deductible plans from their tax-
able income.This provision, however, would have a
similarly small effect on reducing the number of
uninsured individuals because so many of those with-
out coverage face very low marginal income-tax
rates. Moreover, uninsured people purchasing HSAs in
the nongroup market could not benefit from the
HSA exemption from payroll and social security taxes.
How Will Health Savings Accounts Affect
People with Health Insurance?
The Nongroup Market
Many people in the nongroup market are already
purchasing plans with deductibles that would qualify
for the HSA provisions; for this group, the new tax
treatment provides a pure benefit that does not
require a coverage change. Others who would have
purchased individual coverage even without the sub-
sidy will also benefit. Some, however, are likely to
Table 2. Tax Savings by Tax Bracket
Middle-Income Uninsured (15.2 million)
Tax Savings
Marginal Income Tax Bracket Dollar Amount Percent of $2,000 Premium
15%1 $58 3%
22.65%2 $87 4%
30.3%3 $117 6%
1 Assumes that HSA contributions are not made through payroll deductions, tax savings are from personal income taxes only.
2 Assumes HSA contributions are made through payroll deductions and employees benefit from their share of Social Security and
Medicare tax savings, in addition to personal income tax savings.
3 Assumes HSA contributions are made through payroll deductions and employees benefit from both employer and employee shares
of Social Security and Medicare tax savings, in addition to personal income tax savings.
Source: Current Population Survey, 2003.
Table 3. Number of Newly Insured Through HSA Subsidies,
Under Different Estimates of Responsiveness
High-Deductible Health Plan Responsiveness Standard Policy Responsiveness
Low-Income Uninsured 28,000 169,000
Adults (18.8 million)
Middle-Income Uninsured 66,000 401,000
Adults (15.2 million)
Note:We assume that low-income uninsured adults face a marginal tax rate of 7.65% and middle-income uninsured adults face a
marginal tax rate of 22.65% (see Figure 1 and Tables 1 and 2).We estimate that the tax savings for low-income uninsured people are
equal to 1.5% of a high-deductible health insurance premium, while for middle-income uninsured people they are equal to 4.4% of
a high-deductible health insurance premium (see Tables 1 and 2).We use a take-up rate estimate of 0.1 for the high-deductible
responsiveness category, and an estimate of 0.6 for the standard responsiveness category.
Source: Current Population Survey, 2003.
plans, reducing the effects of adverse selection
(disproportionate enrollments of people who
require more expensive care) in this market.
The Group Market
The effects of HSAs are likely to be quite different
in the group insurance market. Despite recent
increases in deductibles, most people in the group
market continue to have coverage with deductibles
that are lower than required for HSA-eligibility.12
In this market, then, HSA-eligible plans are likely
to be most attractive to healthy, high income
employees.This group will gain the most benefit
from the tax provisions of HSAs, because they face
high marginal tax rates, do save, and will be able to
accumulate balances in their accounts over time.
Where employers offer multiple plans, a shift
of healthy employees toward one type of plan can
set off a spiral of premium escalation in other
plans.13 This set of events can leave people who
prefer lower-deductible plans worse off. In its
extreme manifestations, such spirals can lead to the
disappearance of generous insurance plans, even if
these plans had been operating efficiently.
Many firms, particularly small firms, offer
only one plan.These firms, moreover, tend to be
very sensitive to the preferences of their more
highly compensated employees.14 Thus, any shift of
high-income workers toward HSAs is likely to lead
to changes in the types of plans offered by these
employers.A movement toward high-deductible
plans as the sole type of plan offered in small firms
would be harmful to many of their low-income
workers, who derive little benefit from the HSA
tax provisions and are unlikely to be able to save
enough to cover their out-of-pocket expenses.
They may drop coverage rather than contribute
toward the premium cost of a plan that offers them
little protection for out-of-pocket costs.
The problem created by changes in the pref-
erences of highly compensated workers would be
exacerbated by the extension of tax deductibility
for the premiums of HSAs purchased outside the
workplace.This policy would offer high-income
workers a valuable option that might not be avail-
able in the workplace at all.A resultant exodus of
high-income workers from the job-based health
insurance system would have disproportionately
large effects on the stability of that system altogether.
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METHODOLOGY
The researchers considered three different scenarios for estimating the tax savings associated with HSAs:
1. The baseline analysis assumed that all HSA contributions would be made through payroll deductions so that
participating workers could avoid paying the employee share of Social Security and Medicare taxes—7.65
percent. In addition, employers, not individual employees, were assumed to benefit from the savings associ-
ated with sheltering the employer share of Social Security and Medicare taxes through payroll deductions.
2. The researchers examined what would happen if HSA contributions were not made by payroll deduction,
and assigned workers no savings associated with Social Security and Medicare taxes.
3. The researchers assigned workers the full employer-plus-employee tax rate of 15.3 percent as the social insur-
ance tax.This scenario reflects a common assumption in economics about the long-run impact of these taxes.
Summing the marginal income tax and social insurance tax rates yields a total marginal tax rate on earnings. For
those in a zero-percent marginal income tax bracket, the total tax rate on earnings would be 7.65 percent in the
baseline scenario, 0 percent in the second scenario, and 15.3 percent in the third (where HSA contributions are
made through payroll and employees ultimately benefit from tax savings associated with both the employee and
employer share of social insurance taxes).
About 45 percent of uninsured adults face a marginal income-tax rate greater than 0 percent.Assuming the
average tax rate of 15 percent, their total tax savings would be 22.65 percent in the baseline scenario, 15 percent
in the second scenario, and 30.3 percent in the third.
For the main analysis, the authors used a take-up rate of 0.1.They began with a rate of 0.6, consistent with a
price elasticity (standard responsiveness parameter) of about 0.4 applied to people who do not currently have
public coverage.The authors reduced this take-up rate to reflect the difference between the generosity of stan-
dard employer-sponsored coverage and high-deductible coverage and to reflect the requirement that HSA sav-
ings can only be achieved if people save money in their accounts.
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